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The Endless Umbilical Cord: Parental 




One might think that parental obligation to children ends with the end of child-
hood. I argue that if we consider why parents are obligated to their children, we will 
see that this view is false. Creating children exposes them to life’s risks. When we 
expose others to risks, we are often obligated to minimize damages and compensate 
for harms. Life’s risks last a lifetime, therefore parental obligation to one’s children 
does too. Grown children’s autonomy, and grown children’s independent responsi-
bility for some of their own problems, can sometimes limit what parental responsibil-
ity demands of parents but it doesn’t do away with the responsibility. I argue that my 
conclusions are not as counterintuitive as they might initially seem. I also consider 
the implications that parental obligation to grown children might have on the oft 
assumed obligation that grown children have to care for their parents.
I. Why NOT FOREVER? 
 Taking care of children is hard work. When children are born, they can do 
almost nothing for themselves, they even need help burping. As children get older, 
they usually become more independent and able to care for themselves, freeing 
up their parents from bathing and burping them. And when they turn 18, or 21, or 
(increasingly) 31, children often can really take care of themselves, from burping to 
paying rent. The parents are off the hook then, right?
In a 2015 episode of This American Life, a woman in her early twenties, who was in 
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and out of an abusive relationship since she was a teenager, explained that one reason 
why she stayed with her abuser for so long was that, without him, she was alone since 
her mother spent weekends and holidays with her boyfriend. The young woman 
was even alone on Christmas. I found myself angry with the mother for not being 
there for her daughter, regardless of her daughter’s age. Why leave your young adult 
daughter alone for the holidays when you know her abusive boyfriend is waiting in 
the wings? (The mother was aware of her daughter’s situation). To me, the fact that, 
over the course of her years in an abusive relationship, the teenager has grown into a 
young adult doesn’t do away with her mother’s obligation to care for her as needed. 
Am I alone in this intuitive response? 
 It is not uncommon to think that parental obligation to children ends with the 
end of childhood. Once children are grown, we might think that they are then able to 
care for themselves and parental obligation to care for them is therefore concluded. 
But, if we consider why parents are obligated to their children in the first place, it is 
unclear that parental obligation to children comes with an expiration date. 
In this paper, I argue that parental obligation is lifelong (i.e., for the duration of 
the child’s lifetime). Parental obligation may sometimes require less of parents due 
to the autonomous capacity and agency of adult children, and it can sometimes be 
constrained by the parents’ own legitimate interests, but it never ends. I will begin, in 
section II, by discussing the reasons why parents are obligated to care for their chil-
dren and argue that it is difficult to find a reasonable account that will include a less 
than lifelong endpoint to the obligation. In section III, I will discuss limits to parental 
obligation to grown children. section IV will address objections, and section V will 
address some further questions and implications of the lifelong parental obligation 
for which I argue.
II. sOURCE OF PARENTAL OBLIGATION
Why are parents obligated to care for their children? Before we saddle parents 
with lifelong obligations to their children, it behooves us to think about the reasons 
why parents are obligated to care for their children at all. Maybe once we consider 
why parents have to take care of their children, we will see that they don’t have to do 
so for as long as their children live.
1. Risk Imposition: I argue that parental obligation is incurred because, by procre-
ating, parents expose children to life’s risks (Weinberg 2015). Children exist because 
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their parents engaged in procreative acts which exposed their children to life’s risks.1 
And when we expose other people to risks, we are often obligated to take care to 
minimize damages by meeting some standard of care (however it is set) and/or by pro-
viding compensation if the risk ripens into a harm. For example, because driving is an 
activity that exposes others to risk, we’re required to learn the rules of the road, drive 
uninebriated, buy collision insurance (i.e., meet the standard of care for driving), and 
pay for damages when we fail to meet the standard of care set for driving and damages 
result.
It is procreators who expose children to life’s risks and, I argue, thereby incur 
parental obligations to care for their children. Therefore, when I speak of parental 
obligations, I am speaking of the obligations incurred by procreators. I have argued 
elsewhere regarding which sorts of acts count as procreative and thereby incur paren-
tal obligations (Weinberg 2008 and 2015); here, I argue for how long those obligations 
last. One may disagree regarding whether procreators incur parental obligations, re-
garding which acts count as procreative, and regarding which sorts of parental obli-
gations are transferrable and what constitutes such transfer. My arguments in this 
paper are aimed at how long the parental obligation incurred by procreators lasts.
Procreation exposes children to life’s risks, which are numerous, unpredictable, 
and can result in grave harm.2 Because life is very risky, children are very vulnerable, 
and some of the risks and harms of life are unpredictable and/or unavoidable, our 
standard of parental care for children is very high. We require parents to attend to all 
of their child’s many needs and to raise, nurture, and guide their child to, hopefully, 
an autonomous adulthood. That is, very roughly speaking, our parental standard of 
1. One might wonder about others who might seem to have similarly imposed life’s risks on a per-
son, e.g., a doctor who saves an unconscious person’s life (without explicit consent) or someone who 
stops a person’s suicide attempt. however, these cases differ in important and relevant respects from 
the parental case because parents create a new life but the person whose life is being saved in the 
doctor and suicide cases is already alive and enmeshed in life’s risks. Not only are the people saved 
in these cases already alive and living with life’s risks, but also the saviors presumably have reason to 
believe that the person they are saving really wants to continue living, thus saving is more like acting 
on behalf of another than imposing risks on another. Thanks to Matthew smith for raising these 
kinds of cases.
2.  some might find it odd to speak of imposing life’s risks on our children because, unlike other 
risk imposing cases, our children don’t exist prior to our procreating them so there seems no clearly 
available baseline from which to assess harm. In my view, existence and nonexistence are both neu-
tral states and can serve as a baseline of neutrality from which to assess procreative harms. I argue in 
much more detail for this view in Weinberg, The Risk of a Lifetime (2015). some may also consider life’s 
benefits to generally offset its harms and thereby relieve parents of much procreative and even paren-
tal responsibility. This view is reminiscent of the non-identity problem (see Derek Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons, Oxford University Press, 1984), which I respond to in great detail in Weinberg, op. cit.
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care. Our parental standard of care is very high but we tend to think of it as fading out 
with the autonomous adulthood of grown children.
I am arguing here for a parental standard of care that is lifelong. As parents, we 
try to encourage our children’s autonomy, independence, and self-reliance because 
that’s good for them. (I will be using the term ‘autonomy’ in the broadest sense, to 
include not only the capacity to make decisions using one’s rational capacities, etc., 
but to be capable of independence and making one’s way in the world). People tend 
to feel good and fare well when they are autonomous. That works well for children, 
and the adults into which they grow, freeing up parents from the job of caring for 
their grown children, and allowing grown children to flourish as independent agents. 
Usually. But very often things don’t work out that way.
It can seem reasonable to think of parental responsibility as ending when chil-
dren are grown because, as children grow, their vulnerability usually decreases and 
they usually become able to care for themselves and wish to do so. They no longer need 
or want the care, so it seems reasonable to stop requiring parents to give it to them, 
especially since autonomy is usually good for people and contributes to the ability to 
live a life of human flourishing. But I argue that this way of thinking mischaracter-
izes the situation. In my view, parental care for children is a lifelong obligation but, 
when grown children do better caring for themselves then parental obligation to care 
for them is not expired but, instead, is fulfilled by the autonomous adult children. 
When grown children encounter illness, disability, addiction, or other significant life 
challenges with which they need emotional, physical, or financial help, and parental 
help could really help them, it is hard to see why the parents would not be obligated 
to help. If it’s only a child’s ability to care for herself, and the fact that people tend 
to want to care for themselves and fare better when they do, that lets parents step 
back from their care taking role, when it is not the case that children want to or will 
be better off without parental help, the obligation seems to remain, unaltered. The 
procreative act exposes the child to life’s risks and life’s risks last a lifetime. When it’s 
better for the child to continue receiving parental care, setting parental obligation to 
care for children to just expire at ‘adulthood’ seems arbitrary, and unjustified.
The risk imposition source of parental obligation points toward a lifelong ob-
ligation. What about alternative sources of parental obligation? Will those sources 
point to an earlier end point?
2. Volunteerism: some may think that parental responsibility results from which-
ever act counts as volunteering to be a parent (examples include hill 1991 and Millum 
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2008). That seems to make sense because volunteering to do something usually obli-
gates you to do it. But thinking of parental responsibility as the result of volunteering 
for it will not help us figure out when parental responsibility ends because all it really 
tells us is that parental responsibility is a voluntary commitment of some sort. It does 
not tell us what counts as a voluntary commitment of this type, nor does it tell us the 
limits or endpoint of that commitment. It seems reasonable to presume that volun-
teering for parental obligation commits one to fulfilling that obligation, leaving it to 
other theories to explain the nature and extent of the commitment. All volunteerism 
tells us is that the obligation is incurred voluntarily. In contrast, the risk imposition 
view tells us how parental obligation is incurred, namely, by imposing a risk, and it 
can be informative regarding the nature and duration of that obligation by looking to 
how we treat cases of risk imposition more generally.
3. Causation: some think that parental obligation to care for children is a result 
of the fact that parents are a primary or proximate cause of their children’s existence. 
This account is very broad and difficult to parse because causation is multifaceted 
and can lead one deep into a regress of causal factors. The risk imposition account, in 
contrast, specifically targets a particular kind of act or set of actions that do a specific 
kind of thing, i.e. impose a risk, and is consistent with our moral, legal and societal 
norms regarding risk-imposing activity. Leaving aside the problems we encounter 
when trying to pinpoint causation (Weinberg 2008), if we accept this account we will 
still lack an endpoint for parental obligation to children since parents, on this view, 
are the cause of their child’s existence (and neediness) for however long the existence 
(and neediness) lasts. Arguably, that last a lifetime since children exist for their entire 
lifetimes and their neediness, while less pressing during autonomous adulthood, can 
last a lifetime or crop up periodically at any point during a lifetime.
 It looks like alternate sources of parental obligation are unlikely to help us find 
an earlier endpoint to parental obligation. Of course, there may be other sources of 
parental obligation than those discussed here, and maybe one of those other sources 
could justify an earlier endpoint for parents’ obligation to care for their children. To 
work, these other sources would have to make more sense than the risk imposition 
reason and they would also have to explain why and when parental obligation ends. 
Until then, it looks like we are stuck with a lifelong obligation.
Factors that may limit what parents have to do to meet their parental obligation 
to their grown children include the good and the fact of adult autonomy, and the le-
gitimate and separate interests of the parents. The obligation remains, but it demands 
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less of the parents. I will address these limiting factors in section III. Objections to 
setting a lifelong parental standard of care include adult children’s responsibility for 
problems of their own making, and the generally counterintuitive nature of a lifelong 
parental obligation to adult children. I will address these objections in section IV.
III. LIMITs 
 When setting the parental standard of care, we can think of some pretty per-
suasive reasons to limit what the obligation requires of parents in terms of how much, 
i.e., how much care parents have to provide, and how long, i.e., how long do they have 
to provide it for.
1. Autonomy: The autonomous nature of adulthood argues in favor of adulthood 
as limiting what parental responsibility requires of parents. Both the good and the 
fact of autonomy serve as limiting factors:
  a) The Good of Autonomy: The good of autonomy argues in favor of 
adulthood as limiting what parental responsibility demands of parents, for the adult 
children’s own good. We have ample evidence as well as common sense and com-
monly expressed sentiment telling us that people feel good and seem to fare well 
when they’re running their own lives, being autonomous, being an adult (see sheldon 
et al 1996; Ryan and Deci 2000; and Weinstein 2016, among many others). Children of 
overprotective parents usually don’t fare as well as children whose parents allow for 
more freedom and responsibility (see LeMoyne and Buchanan 2011). Children who 
have too much free floating money, with (presumably) the resulting weaker impetus 
to establish self-sufficiency are at a higher than average risk for drug abuse and addic-
tion (Califano 2003). In short, as most people think and as empirical evidence shows, 
it’s usually good for children to develop and exercise autonomy, in age appropriate 
ways, culminating in an autonomous adulthood. That seems to argue against contin-
uous parental care with life’s challenges. For our children’s own good, we should stop 
taking care of them as they become adults capable of caring for themselves. Great! 
Problem solved?
Not so fast. Thus far, all that has been shown is that autonomy can limit what 
parents have to do to meet their parental obligation, and it only does so to the extent 
that the good of autonomy both applies to the grown child in question (i.e., the child 
is competent) and outweighs the benefits of parental aid. so maybe it’s best for the 
adult child to pay her own rent, but is it really better in terms of well-being for the 
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grown child to, say, take out a huge mortgage on her starter home instead of getting 
some help with the down payment from her parents? If the grown child is generally 
autonomous and responsible, is this one-time cash infusion going to be worse for her 
than a hefty mortgage? And the greater the need, the less the good of autonomy out-
weighs it so you might tell the young adult to wait to buy a house or to buy a smaller 
one, etc., but what if she needs help to pay for a kidney transplant? Or help putting 
food on the table while she looks for a new job? If parents can help when their adult 
children need the help coping with life’s challenges, it is only when the good of au-
tonomy is more important or weightier than the need that we can look to autonomy 
to limit what parents have to do to meet their parental obligation. 
Thus, the good of autonomy for grown children, as a limiting factor on the 
demands of parental obligation to grown children, seems limited to when and to the 
extent that autonomy is actually better for the grown children. In assessing which 
cases meet this limit, we may note that Western culture in general, and American 
culture in particular, go a little crazy in our value of autonomy, self-determination, 
and making it on our own. so a bit of caution in our application of autonomy as 
a limit to the demands of parental obligation to adult children is in order. Maybe 
we fetishize autonomy and overvalue it. Maybe being cared for is pretty great! yes, 
common sense, common sentiment, and empirical evidence do point to autonomy 
as a significant contributor to human well-being, but that contribution is subject 
to limits, caveats, cultural bias, and other contributors to well-being such as health, 
emotional support, shelter and food, etc.
Autonomy is probably usually good and, therefore, parents can withdraw some 
parental care in support of children’s developing autonomy, and as respect for their 
grown children’s actual autonomy. But, still, the good of autonomy will not limit the 
demands of parental obligation to care for their adult children when the care would 
still be good for the adult children in their struggle with life’s risks and challenges, 
despite its potential incursion on adult children’s autonomy.
  b) The Fact of Autonomy: The good of autonomy won’t relieve the pa-
rental obligation to grown children when the parental care would still mitigate life’s 
risks and be good for the adult-children. But the fact of autonomy just might. When 
children in fact grow into autonomous adults, the need for parental care diminishes 
or ends and one might think that the obligation to care should then diminish or end 
as well. Why should parents be obligated to care for adult children who can care for 
themselves? This is a persuasive point and might serve as a reason to significantly 
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limit parental obligation to care for adult children, or to set the parental standard of 
care to zero, once grown children are able to care for themselves, but it will only limit 
the obligation to the extent that adult children actually are able to care for themselves. 
When adult children face illness, disability, job loss, or other serious life problems 
that they cannot handle well on their own, the fact of autonomy will no longer be 
present to serve to limit parental obligation. Therefore, to whatever extent the fact of 
autonomy might set parental obligation to grown children at nothing, it would make 
a difference only to the subset of cases where the good of autonomy doesn’t already 
limit parental obligation anyway and the fact of autonomy remains in place. But even 
then, the fact of autonomy does not clearly free parents from their obligation to their 
grown children.
Because even if adult children can care for themselves, why must they? They 
didn’t ask for any of this. In the immortal words (okay, tweet) of Ricky Montgomery: 
“I am upset with my parents for making me exist. u just decided to make a person 
one day? who’s gonna pay my bills? me? I didn’t ask for this.”3 Parents decide to create 
children, to impose life’s risk on them, thereby obligating parents to care for their 
children. When it is good for children to care for themselves, then we have reason 
for parents to cede the care of their adult children to their adult children, as argued 
earlier. But, when it would be good for adult children to have parental care with life’s 
risks and harms, the good of autonomy notwithstanding, the fact that adult children 
have the ability to care for themselves doesn’t cleanly or completely get parents off the 
hook because taking care of oneself is a lot of un-volunteered for work. Why should 
adult children have to do all of this work all by themselves when the only reason the 
work needs to be done is because their parents decided to create a needing-lots-of-
work human? The parents created the problem. Why should the adult children have 
to work to solve it, just because they might be capable of doing so? (This reasoning 
also applies to causal accounts of parental obligation since generally, on those views, 
parents are responsible to meet the needs or remedy the problems that they caused).
In other risk imposition cases, we usually don’t require compensation if the stan-
3.  The view that parents may be obligated to help adult children with life’s risks and harms be-
cause parents imposed those risks on their children does not entail that we are all free of all moral re-
sponsibility because all moral responsibility was thrust upon us involuntarily. Just because we didn’t 
volunteer for existence that does not mean we can, say, steal from or assault another person. Those 
sorts of involuntary moral obligations can derive from sources that are unaffected by the involuntary 
nature of existence, e.g., Kantian respect, contractualist respect, contractarian prudence, or Aristote-
lian enlightened self-interest in living well. It is only some forms of consequentialist obligation that 
are vulnerable to the involuntary nature of existence challenge and, in my view, that counts against it 
as a moral theory. (see Rivka Weinberg, “It ‘Ain’t My World,” Utilitas 2009 21: 144-162).
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dard of care has been met, which is what we do in a no-fault car accident, for example. 
But that’s because we all benefit from allowing people to drive and so we have set our 
standard of care for driving at driving responsibly and we don’t require compensa-
tion when that standard is met. That’s a standard that works for all of us, generally, or 
at least it’s supposed to. similarly, the fact of autonomy can argue in favor of setting 
the parental standard of care at a grown child’s ability to care for themselves—maybe 
that’s the standard that’s most fair to all of us. And once that standard is met, parents 
would not be required to provide further care for their children. But the fact that chil-
dren, unlike a society of drivers, didn’t agree to participate in the risk activity of life 
and, unlike a society of drivers who would likely be inconvenienced by a driving ban, 
stand to lose nothing by not being born, argues against setting the parental standard 
of care to end at the fact of autonomy: that standard might work well for parents but 
it doesn’t seem equally fair to children because the children don’t gain as much by 
having that standard as the parents do.
 For those who think that life is some sort of lovely gift bestowed on children (as 
opposed to my view of life as a set of risks imposed on children), it may be reasonable 
to conclude that once children are able to care for themselves, they should. They’ve 
been given a gift, they are competent to use the gift and operate within its constraints, 
now go off and enjoy. No need for further babysitting. Parental obligation to care for 
grown children, on this view, would be limited to cases where the fact of autonomy 
is not present. But I don’t think that view is reasonable. It is far too rosy to count as 
realistic and it neglects the fact that children did not ask for this hard to manage ‘gift’ 
that was thrust upon them. It’s not as if the ‘gift’ can be safely ignored—life takes a 
lot of work just to avoid severe suffering. I therefore think it is more realistic to view 
life as a mixed bag of uncertain benefits and burdens—as a set of risks imposed on 
children by the parents who created them—than as a gift. Thus, Montgomery’s point 
retains some force, and serves to leave parental obligation to adult children in place 
even when the fact of autonomy is present.
2. Parental Interests: Another possible limitation to what parental obligation 
to grown children demands is the legitimate interests of the parents. Parents, pre-
sumably, are entitled to pursue their own good to some extent, even at times at the 
expense of their children’s good. We normally do not fault parents for spending some 
discretionary money on themselves, even if that money could have benefited their 
children. Parenthood doesn’t strip people of legitimate interests and the reasonable 
permission to pursue those interests, even, at least to some extent, when parents’ in-
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terests conflict with their children’s interests. so you can sometimes have your latte 
instead of buying your child a toy, and you can get a pair of work boots instead of 
getting your six-year-old summer sandals, but if she needs specialized treatment for, 
say, Attention-Deficit Disorder, probably not.
I will not attempt here to figure out exactly when parents cross the line into un-
acceptable selfishness or exactly how much parents are required to sacrifice for the 
sake of their children. But there’s a vague, somewhat flexible line out there, and that 
can limit how much parents are required to do for or give to their children, in order 
to mitigate life’s risks. I assume that limit line applies to adult children as well. But 
does it apply differently to adult children than it does to toddlers? Does that fuzzy line 
of permissible pursual of parental interest even at the expense of children’s interests 
gradually allow for parental interests to prevail more often or to a greater degree as 
children grow into adults? Does that line move to give parents more moral leeway to 
prioritize themselves and/or to provide their children with less care once their chil-
dren are grown? It is not clear why it would, aside from the fact that children need 
less, can care for themselves more, and can perhaps be held responsible for their needs 
more (more on that in section IV) as they grow into autonomous adulthood. When 
thinking about whether parental interests can give parents greater leeway to favor 
themselves over their children as their children grow, aside from the leeway gained 
due to grown children’s autonomy and agency, it is unclear why or how parental in-
terests should count for more, vis a vis children’s interests, once children are grown 
than they count for when children are younger.
One might argue that since parents generally yield more to their children’s in-
terests when their children are younger, it is only fair to let parental interest prevail 
and have greater weight when children are older, after parents have often already 
made many sacrifices for their children. however, this ‘fair play’ principle only holds 
if parents and children have equal priority claims, i.e., if parents’ and children’s inter-
ests are on equal footing. If parents’ and children’s interests have equal weight, then it 
may make sense to give greater weight to parental interests when children are grown 
since greater weight is usually given to children’s interests while they are growing up. 
The problem with this tempting way of thinking about parent-child interests is that 
we don’t have equal claim to priority in the procreative case: Because having children 
is the parents’ choice, but being born is not the child’s choice, the claim to having 
one’s interests curtailed by the other’s are not on equal footing. The responsibility to 
tend to the other’s interests is only incurred by the parents. It therefore seems unwar-
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ranted for the parents to say to their grown children, “Well, my child, it’s your turn 
to yield your interests in favor of mine now.” 
3. Autonomy and Parental Interests, Combined: Maybe the fact that adult children 
can care for themselves can provide us with a reason why parental interests can be 
given greater weight once children are grown. since parents are entitled to pursue 
their own interests, when their children are grown and able to care for themselves, 
it seems fair to give parental interests greater weight, thereby allowing the obligation 
of parents to care for their autonomous, able-to-care-for-themselves adult children 
to require much less of the parents. This limit, to whatever extent it is sound, only 
applies when adults can truly care for themselves. In the many cases where adult chil-
dren really do need care with life’s challenges, regardless of whether they’re usually 
able to care for themselves more generally, parental obligation to care ratchets right 
back up. Furthermore, even when adult children can care for themselves, the fact that 
the parents forced the adult children into having to take such care as life requires can 
serve as reason for parents to have to assist, regardless, so long as that’s in the adult 
child’s interests (remember the Montgomery!). 
IV. OBJECTIONs
so far, we seem to have established a strong but possibly somewhat circum-
scribed obligation for parents to care for their grown children to the extent that their 
children need or could benefit from help with life’s challenges. But what about cases 
where adult children need help not because their parents created them but because 
they themselves created lots of their own problems? 
1. Messes of Their Own Making: Not everything is your mother’s fault. you did 
some stupid stuff too. you may have messed up your own life. Why shouldn’t grown 
children bear the burdens of their own making? I think that this challenge is im-
portant and can conceivably, in some cases and under appropriate circumstances, 
serve to blunt parental obligations to grown children. Exactly when and exactly to 
what extent, I leave open for further consideration. One might argue that even if 
some of grown children’s problems are of their own making, they themselves are of 
their parents’ making, and had their parents not created them, they wouldn’t have 
any problems or any opportunity to make any so there is a sense in which all of our 
problems are in some way of our parents’ making. But that way seems too weak to 
generate parental responsibility to solve the problems. We don’t generally obligate 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 RIVKA WEINBERG66
people to solve all problems to which they have a causal connection. setting aside 
questions regarding free will (which could undermine grown children’s responsibil-
ity for their own problems and parental responsibility for their procreative acts, etc.), 
when adult children seem to clearly create their own problems, we have at least some 
reason to think that their parents might not be responsible to solve these problems. 
(This doesn’t mean that society needn’t help people who may have caused their own 
problems. societal or civic obligations arise for different reasons and serve different 
purposes than parental obligations).
 Before all you parents relax, remember that many, and maybe most, of the situ-
ations that put adults in need of parental care are nobody’s fault, e.g., disease (mental 
or physical), job loss, addiction, etc. Many of the life challenges that grown children 
will need help with are situations beyond their control, such as many cases of illness, 
heartbreak, disability, or financial insufficiency. When we create children, we know 
this. We know the risks we are imposing. Why shouldn’t we be on the hook for them 
so long as they are present and we can help? I argue that, for the most part, indeed we 
are.
2. Deeply Counter-Intuitive: so why don’t we think we are? I certainly do not think 
that my parents are obligated to care for me, and you probably don’t think that your 
parents should be taking care of you. Most adults do not think that their parents are 
obligated to take care of them. But that might be because people value their auton-
omy and tend to fare better when they live autonomously, without lifelong parental 
assistance. At first, the idea that parental obligation is lifelong is deeply counterintui-
tive yet, if you imagine yourself in true need and your parents in a position to help 
you with a life challenge, the intuition may change. If you were sick and needed help 
with paying for your medical treatment, and your parents could help you, shouldn’t 
they? Wouldn’t you find it disturbing if your parents decided to take a trip to spain 
while you become homeless, or dead, because your cancer left you unable to work or 
afford health care? Consider cases of children who are not capable of autonomy, e.g., 
children with serious cognitive limitations. Would we think it okay for parents to 
just walk away from them when they turn 18 or 21 or 41? Probably not (see Desante 
2016). so why would it be okay to walk away from a usually autonomous adult child 
who happens not to be autonomously capable of handling certain aspects of her life 
challenges, like paying for health insurance or fillings or a roof? Maybe because it is 
usually best to care for oneself, to figure out ways to be responsible and autonomous. 
Once again, it seems that it is only when it would be best for the adult child to be left 
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to fend for themselves that we have a strong intuition telling us it is okay for parents 
to leave them to fend for themselves (which is pretty consistent with what I’ve argued 
here).
Let’s consider some additional cases. should parents take out a second mortgage 
on their house to pay for their 8-year old’s cancer treatment? Intuitively, I think the 
answer is a very clear yes. should parents take out a second mortgage on their house 
to pay for their 38-year old’s cancer treatment? Intuitively, the answer may strike us as 
less clear but I still think it’s a yes, though possibly mitigated by the adult child’s own 
ability and responsibility, e.g., can she remortgage her own house? Does she need 
cancer treatment because she chose to skip her (free and relatively painless) PAP 
smears? If the answers to these limiting questions are resounding “no’s,” then I think 
the parents probably have to remortgage their house. Goodbye condo in Florida! One 
might argue that we tend to think parents should care for adult children in these cases 
because they have a current relationship with their adult children. however, we can 
see that the current relationship is not doing all the work here when we contrast our 
attitude toward parents with what we might expect of friends, even close friends. We 
expect parents to sacrifice for their adult children in these cases, even if the current 
relationship is not especially close, but we tend to expect much less of friends, even 
close current friends. When the grown child seems to have caused, or volunteered 
for her own problems, we may not think that her parents are obligated to care for her, 
and when it seems best for the autonomous adult to handle her own problems, we 
may think it best for her to do so without parental assistance, but all that is fairly con-
sistent with the findings of this paper. When the adult child’s problems are not of her 
own making and/or when it does not seem best for the adult child to forgo parental 
help, then thinking that her parents are responsible to care for her (to the extent that 
they can, of course) probably does not strike us as so terribly counterintuitive after 
all.
V: FURThER QUEsTIONs/IMPLICATIONs
 1. Grandparents’ Obligations? should we visit the sins of the fathers on the 
grandfathers? If we hold parents responsible to care for their children because they 
imposed life’s risks on them, does this responsibility extend to grandparents? I argue 
that it does not. From a risk imposition perspective, we hold parents responsible to 
care for their children because, by choosing to procreate, parents impose life’s risks 
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on their children and when we impose risks or expose others to risks in order to do 
the things we want to do, we must take care to mitigate damages and compensate for 
harms, in accordance with the standards of care we set for the risk imposing activity. 
Grandparents don’t impose life’s risks on their grandchildren so they are not obli-
gated to care for them at any stage of the child’s life. 
 however, since parents are responsible to care for their children, they can 
sometimes be responsible to help their children meet the obligations that the children 
incur. Those obligations may sometimes include rent, sometimes a hospital bill, and 
sometimes care for children (the children’s children, i.e., the grandchildren). When 
grandparents are responsible to care for their grandchildren, the obligation is deriva-
tive from their obligation to their children. These derivative obligations are subject 
to the same limiting factors that standard parental obligations to grown children are 
subject to: namely, the good of autonomy and the independent responsibility of the 
children. Grandchildren may sometimes be a paradigm case of the independent re-
sponsibility of grown children, thereby limiting grandparents’ obligations.
 A causal account of parental obligation to children would also fail to extend 
that obligation from grandparents to grandchildren because, although no one would 
exist but for their grandparents’ procreativity, the mere causal connection between 
grandparents and grandchildren is not sufficient to ground parental or pseudo-paren-
tal obligations because we generally don’t hold people responsible for just any situa-
tion to which they have causally contributed. Those who argue for a causation based 
parental obligation to children usually narrow the kind of causation down to primary 
or proximate causation and grandparents usually don’t play that causal role in the 
creation of their grandchildren because the parents of the children are usually more 
causally primary and proximate. Alternatively, one might argue for a straightforward 
‘genetic relation’ obligation to children and maybe that source of parental obliga-
tion can extend to grandparents but citing genetic relation as a source or reason for 
parental obligation invites the question: Why does a genetic relationship to a child 
create an obligation to care for the child? I suspect that any reasonable answer to that 
question will appeal directly or indirectly to one of the sources of parental obligation 
discussed here (namely, voluntarism, causation, or risk imposition).
 2. Procreative Constraint? If we consider parental obligation to last a lifetime, we 
may wonder how this lengthy obligation impacts our views on when procreation is 
morally permissible. For example, if parental obligation is endless, might that make 
it unacceptable for people to have children when they are older and thus less able to 
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provide care for their children for a prolonged period? This question is different from 
my focus in this paper, which is on whether parents who can mitigate life’s risks and 
harms for their adult children must do so when it would be in their grown children’s 
interests. My answer to that question is, yes, that is part of what parents are generally 
obligated to do. Whether this obligation impacts procreative permissibility is a ques-
tion I will not address here except to gesture at a vague, and very qualified ‘to some 
extent.’ The fact that parental obligation doesn’t have a hard stop at 18 or 21 does 
mean that the older people are when they have children, the more problematic their 
procreativity becomes in this respect. Of course, parents usually don’t outlive their 
children so, at some point, they will no longer be available to care for them, but the 
later that point arrives, generally, the more the parent will be able to fulfill the lifelong 
aspect of their parental obligation. There are many factors that come together to help 
determine the moral permissibility of procreation in any given case and, if my conclu-
sions here about a lifelong parental obligation to children are sound, then the ability 
of a person to provide continued care as needed for their child will count as one such 
factor, subject of course to being outweighed by many other factors. (Of course, there 
is a constraint on the other end as well since having children when one is very young 
poses its own set of problems for all concerned, and often problems far greater than 
those posed when having children at an older age). 
3. Children’s Obligation to Care for Aging Parents? We may wonder whether think-
ing of parents as obligated to care for their adult children gets things exactly back-
ward. Isn’t it generally assumed that adult children have to care for their parents?4 Is 
that not the direction of parent-adult child obligation? Many have argued that adult 
children are indeed responsible to care for their parents, should parents need the 
care. This responsibility has been argued for on various grounds, including friend-
ship (English 1979 and Dixon 1995), gratitude or a debt for past parental sacrifices 
(Wicclair 1990), social contract, or social good, some interpretations of Confucianism 
(Archard 1986), and involuntary special relationships (sommers 1986). One might be 
forgiven for thinking that there are so many different grounds for filial obligation 
because none are particularly convincing. Most of these theories have obvious prob-
lems. I will not discuss the problems in detail here but I will briefly note that friend-
ship does not always exist between parents and children and that friendship usually 
does not require a highly burdensome level of care for another person. similarly, we 
usually don’t think that gratitude for a voluntary (and largely unasked for) sacrifice 
4. I thank my sons, Rami and Joey Gruman, for (separately) raising this objection.
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or gift generates steep and on-going obligation. Basing filial obligation on the duties 
inherent to the special parent-child relationship sounds more like a claim than an 
argument and therefore seems question begging. That leaves us with a more societal 
or social contract based obligation for adult children to care for their parents. This 
may seem like a more promising basis for filial obligation because it is based more on 
what might work well on a societal level rather than on specific filial debts or duties 
that, as argued, are very difficult to justify. But ‘social good,’ ‘overall good,’ and/or ‘so-
cietal good,’ are themselves thorny justifications for specific and highly burdensome 
individual obligations.
It is not all that easy to justify filial obligation. It is easier to explain why we take 
ourselves to have it. For most of human history, virtually the only care aging people 
had available to them came from their children. so it is no big shocker that many cul-
tures ingrained this value. Adults needed it. Furthermore, reciprocity is an adaptive 
trait (Cole and Teboul 2004; Fehr et al 2002), and although not necessarily adaptive 
in this case (because parents will have already provided the good so why help them 
later, when they can’t help back), the general trait of reciprocity may dispose us to feel 
the reciprocal pull of parental care as generating a filial duty to care for parents.
 It looks like our feelings of filial obligation are easy to explain but much harder 
to morally justify. It can also be challenging to square our feelings of filial obligation 
with the proposed obligation of parents to care for adult children. But that is just a 
case of understandable sentiment meeting a perhaps unexpected argument. At worst, 
we have what is sometimes known as philosophy. At best, we have mutual obligation 
of care between parents and adult children (kumbaya!). I prefer philosophy but I offer 
the happier resolution as well.
VI: CONCLUsION
 It is not uncommon to hear people speaking of parental obligations as clearly 
concluding when children reach adulthood. This may be a comforting thought for 
some parents, as it may allow them to feel a burden lifted, an obligation paid in full, 
and a liberation from the sacrifices that parenting often demands. yet, as I have shown 
here, parental obligation is lifelong. We impose life’s risks on our children by creating 
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them and our responsibility to mitigate those risks and harms lasts for the duration of 
the risks and harms, i.e., for the duration of our children’s lives.
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